The paper reflects on the difficulties in implementing the so-called differentiated autonomy pursuant to Article 116, paragraph 3, of the Constitution. The implementig Law no. 86/2024 was in fact recently interested by a ruling by the Constitutional Court (ruling no. 192/2024). It focuses primarily on the financial aspects, highlighting how the Constitutional Court has significantly scaled down the architecture of Law no. 86/2024, exposing some significant distortions of the constitutional framework imposed by underlying political will. It is highlighted how the Consitutional Court expressed a constitutionally oriented interpretation of art. 116 c. 3, of the Constitution, and drew the constitutional tracks along which it will be possible to proceed in the future, from which law no. 86/2024 derailed. In particular, the reflection takes place on some aspects of law no. 86/2024 that the Court rejected. In particular about the definition of the transferable functions perimeter, about the procedure for determining the so-called “Lep”, about transferred functions financing mechanism, about the relationship between the financing system for the administrative functions in ordinary autonomy (art. 119 of the Constitution) or in differentiated autonomy (art. 116, c. 3, of the Constitution). It is highlighted how the Court ruling, with regard to the constitutional system of territorial autonomies, identified the point of balance between the opposing needs (unity and differentiation) within it is possible to implement forms of differentiated autonomy, and rejected the structure of law no. 86/2024 aimed at excessively maximizing the autonomy pole with risks of disarticulation.
Il lavoro riflette delle difficoltà nell’attuazione sull’attuazione della c.d. autonomia differenziata ex art. 116, c. 3, della Costituzione. La legge n. 86/2024 è stata infatti di recente oggetto dell’intervento della Corte costituzionale (sent. n. 192/2024). Ci si sofferma soprattutto sui profili finanziari evidenziando come la Corte Costituzionale abbia ridimensionato fortemente l’architettura della legge n. 86/2024 mettendo a nudo alcune significative forzature del quadro costituzionale imposte dalla volontà politica che l’ha animata. Si sottolinea come la Corte dia un’interpretazione costituzionalmente orientata dell’art. 116, c. 3, Cost. tracciando i binari costituzionali lungo i quali si potrà procedere in futuro, dai quali la legge n. 86/2024 ha deragliato. In particolare, la riflessione si svolge su alcuni profili della legge n. 86/2024 che la Corte ha bocciato, e in particolare la definizione del perimetro delle funzioni trasferibili, la procedura di determinazione dei c.d. Lep, i meccanismi di finanziamento delle funzioni trasferite e il rapporto tra il sistema di finanziamento delle funzioni in autonomia ordinaria (art. 119 Cost.) e quelle in autonomia differenziata (art. 116, c. 3, Cost). Si evidenzia come la Corte nella sentenza, con riguardo all’assetto costituzionale dell’autonomie territoriali, abbia individuato il punto di equilibrio tra le opposte esigenze di unità e di differenziazione entro cui è consentito attuare forme di autonomia differenziata, bocciando l’impianto della legge n. 86/2024 diretta a massimizzare eccessivamente il polo della dell’autonomia esponendo al rischio di disarticolazione del sistema.
ALCUNE FORZATURE DELLA LEGGE N. 86/2024 DI ATTUAZIONE DELL’AUTONOMIA DIFFERENZIATA CON RIGUARDO AI PROFILI FINANZIARI E LA DEFINIZIONE DEI RELATIVI LIMITI COSTITUZIONALI NELLA SENTENZA N. 192/2024 DELLA CORTE COSTITUZIONALE
Danilo Pappano
2026-01-01
Abstract
The paper reflects on the difficulties in implementing the so-called differentiated autonomy pursuant to Article 116, paragraph 3, of the Constitution. The implementig Law no. 86/2024 was in fact recently interested by a ruling by the Constitutional Court (ruling no. 192/2024). It focuses primarily on the financial aspects, highlighting how the Constitutional Court has significantly scaled down the architecture of Law no. 86/2024, exposing some significant distortions of the constitutional framework imposed by underlying political will. It is highlighted how the Consitutional Court expressed a constitutionally oriented interpretation of art. 116 c. 3, of the Constitution, and drew the constitutional tracks along which it will be possible to proceed in the future, from which law no. 86/2024 derailed. In particular, the reflection takes place on some aspects of law no. 86/2024 that the Court rejected. In particular about the definition of the transferable functions perimeter, about the procedure for determining the so-called “Lep”, about transferred functions financing mechanism, about the relationship between the financing system for the administrative functions in ordinary autonomy (art. 119 of the Constitution) or in differentiated autonomy (art. 116, c. 3, of the Constitution). It is highlighted how the Court ruling, with regard to the constitutional system of territorial autonomies, identified the point of balance between the opposing needs (unity and differentiation) within it is possible to implement forms of differentiated autonomy, and rejected the structure of law no. 86/2024 aimed at excessively maximizing the autonomy pole with risks of disarticulation.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


