Decision making in a social ambit involves both individual optimal choices and social choices. The theory of “perverse effects” by Boudon shows that the sum of rational individual choices can produce a very undesirable global effect. Then decision making in social action must keep into account the theory of cooperative games with many players, in order to obtain the optimal strategies. Because of the semantic uncertainty in the definition of social actions, it is preferable assume that the issues are represented by fuzzy numbers.
Decision Making in Social Actions
MARCARELLI G;
2010-01-01
Abstract
Decision making in a social ambit involves both individual optimal choices and social choices. The theory of “perverse effects” by Boudon shows that the sum of rational individual choices can produce a very undesirable global effect. Then decision making in social action must keep into account the theory of cooperative games with many players, in order to obtain the optimal strategies. Because of the semantic uncertainty in the definition of social actions, it is preferable assume that the issues are represented by fuzzy numbers.File in questo prodotto:
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