The international jurisprudence relating to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has largely relied on the interpretative criteria speci ed in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), in particu- lar in those set out in Article 31, which establishes the “general rule of interpreta- tion”. Indeed, not only Article 31 VCLT ts well with the structure and nature of a treaty like UNCLOS, but international courts and tribunals often apply the general rule of interpretation to avoid endorsing a unilateral interpretation of UNCLOS, as well as to lay stress on the progressive emergence of new rules that re ect a change in the interests of the international community as a whole. One can most certainly commend a jurisprudence that clearly seeks to restrain creeping jurisdiction (where its only purpose is to protect the interests of a coastal State, rather than also to pro- tect the interests of the international community) and, therefore, the new forms of “sovereigntism”, imperialism and unilateralism that, in recent years, have unfortu- nately characterized the external relations of an ever-increasing number of States.
The 'General Rule of Interpretation' in the International Jurisprudence Relating to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Virzo Roberto
2019-01-01
Abstract
The international jurisprudence relating to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has largely relied on the interpretative criteria speci ed in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), in particu- lar in those set out in Article 31, which establishes the “general rule of interpreta- tion”. Indeed, not only Article 31 VCLT ts well with the structure and nature of a treaty like UNCLOS, but international courts and tribunals often apply the general rule of interpretation to avoid endorsing a unilateral interpretation of UNCLOS, as well as to lay stress on the progressive emergence of new rules that re ect a change in the interests of the international community as a whole. One can most certainly commend a jurisprudence that clearly seeks to restrain creeping jurisdiction (where its only purpose is to protect the interests of a coastal State, rather than also to pro- tect the interests of the international community) and, therefore, the new forms of “sovereigntism”, imperialism and unilateralism that, in recent years, have unfortu- nately characterized the external relations of an ever-increasing number of States.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
