The basic proposition of this paper is that Keynes’s analysis of uncertainty has continuing relevance as a contribution to economic theory and decision theory. Keynes’s original analysis and its subsequent development by Post Keynesians can provide the foundations for a more general theory of decision-making under uncertainty. Keynes’s analysis can be extended to encompass both orthodox risk-based theories such as subjective expected utility theory as well as recent non-risk-based research on ambiguity and the heuristics and biases approach of Tversky and Kahneman.

A Post Keynesian Theory of Decision-Making Under Uncertainty

FONTANA G;
2004

Abstract

The basic proposition of this paper is that Keynes’s analysis of uncertainty has continuing relevance as a contribution to economic theory and decision theory. Keynes’s original analysis and its subsequent development by Post Keynesians can provide the foundations for a more general theory of decision-making under uncertainty. Keynes’s analysis can be extended to encompass both orthodox risk-based theories such as subjective expected utility theory as well as recent non-risk-based research on ambiguity and the heuristics and biases approach of Tversky and Kahneman.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12070/3136
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